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REPLY
THE WATER WAS NOT SEVERED FROM THE LAND ON NOVEMBER 30, 1969.
1.

Respondents cannot avoid the legal effect of Section 73-1-

11 U.C.A. by claiming the water was severed from the land
November 17, 1969.

The reason for this is simple - no severance

occurred on November 17, 1969.

On November 17, 1969 title to the

land upon which said water was being placed to use was, if
anything, unified, not severed.

It is undisputed that the land

upon which the water was being placed to use originally belonged
to Lorna and Clara's parents.

On January 16, 1968 said land was

conveyed to Lorna, Clara, and their three brothers and sisters
(PI. Ex. No. 6). If the water did not pass as an appurtenance to
this transfer of land, then the severance Respondents allege
occurred here.

Lorna and Clara's parents would then have

retained the water - which they thereafter transferred to Lorna
and Clara by Quit Claim Deeds on November 17, 1969.

Thus, on

November 17, 1969 Lorna and Clara's parents unified, not severed,
the title because they reunited title to the water with the
owners of the land upon which said water was being placed to use,
Lorna and Clara.

Thus, whether the water passed to Lorna and

Clara as an appurtenance to the land on January 16, 1968 or by
quit claim deeds on November 17, 1969 is somewhat irrelevant.
The fact is, under either theory they unquestionably owned the
water and the land upon which that water was being used as of
November 17, 1969.

Title was thus unified.

Then, one month

later, when Lorna and Clara conveyed said land, with all

1

appurtenances, said water passed to the grantees of those
conveyances under statutory authority of Section 73-1-11 U.C.A.
Each of the following facts is undisputed.

Each confirms

that title to the land and water was unified as of November 17,
1969 - under anyone's theory of title - and that the water was
then unquestionably appurtenant to the land and passed as an
appurtenance to land conveyances of December 30 and 31, 1969.
The undisputed facts are:
a.

On January 16, 1968 Lorna and Clara received by

warranty deed the land upon which the subject water was
being placed to use. (PI. Ex. No. 6). This transfer
included all appurtenances and is the root title by which
appellant claims the water and is the root title found in
the title abstract maintained by the Utah State Engineer
(PI. Ex. No.6).

But, the Trial Court held and the Court of

Appeals agreed that the water could not pass as an
appurtenance to this land transfer because water does not
become appurtenant to the land until the State Engineer
issues his certificate of appropriation on the water so
used.

(See attached Opinion pp. 4 and 5).

Under this

theory there would have been a severance between the land
and water titles on January

16, 1968 because the conveyance

did not include appurtenant water.

b.

The State Engineer issued the Certificate of

Appropriation on the contested water right October 21, 1969.
2

Because of a descriptive error said Certificate was amended
and re-issued November 25, 1969. (PTO 111(d), FF14).

c.

Under Respondents theory of title and that accepted by

the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, Lorna and Clara
received the contested water right November 17, 1969 by
virtue of two Quit Claim Deeds.

(FF 15; Opinion p.5)

Neither deed is found anywhere within the State Engineers
files maintained for the contested water right (PTO V (2)).
Neither is found in the State Engineers Title Abstract on
the contested water right and they were not filed with the
Kane County Recorder as required by 73-1-10 U.C.A. (PTO V
(2)).

Thus, for Respondents to suggest - as they do on page

12 of their brief - that the State Engineer and respondent
derived their chain of title in the same manner because they
arrived at the same conclusion is blatantly misleading and
dead wrong.

It is the same as saying Highway 1-15 and 1-80

are the same highway because they both pass through Salt
Lake City.

The State Engineer's title abstract does not

contain Respondents root title documents and it is here that
the highway divides between Respondents chain of title and
the chains of Appellants and the State Engineer.

The State

Engineer's title abstract and that of Appellant are
virtually identical.

The only reason they differ is that

the State Engineer did not have all the deeds further down
the chain.

Otherwise, the conclusions of Appellant and the

State Engineer would unquestionably be the same.
3

d.

If the land and the water titles were severed by the

January 16, 1868 land conveyance, they were unquestionably
unified November 17, 1968 because Lorna and Clara, the
owners of land be virtue of the warranty deed of January 16,
1968, received the water being used on that land by quit
claim deeds of November 17, 1969.
e.

(FF 15; Opinion p.5).

The water was actually being placed to use on the land

held by Lorna and Clara throughout the 1969 irrigation
season.

f.

(Tr. 42; 4. Order Amend, FF.).

On December 30 and 31, 1969 Lorna and Clara joined

their two brothers and one sister in dividing the land upon
which the water was being used between themselves.

The

warranty deeds conveying the land included all appurtenances
and did not reserve the water.

This family distribution -

on December 30 and 31, 1969 - constitutes the basis of
Appellant's argument that even if water did not pass as an
appurtenance to the land until the State Engineer's
certificate of appropriation issued, the water nevertheless
passed as an appurtenance to the land on December 30 and 31,
1969 because it was at that time unquestionably appurtenant
to the land and the land was conveyed with all
appurtenances. (Pis. Ex. D-3, D-4, and D-5).

These deeds

are conveniently omitted in Respondent's chain of title.

4

g.

The only testimony of Lorna and Clara was that the deed

of December 31, 1969 was how they thought they received
their water and that they only received a portion of the
water right (Tr. 127, 136), not all of it as suggested by
Respondent and not by the quit claim deeds relied upon by
Respondent.

The remainder went to their two brothers by

warranty deeds dated December 30, 1969. (Pis. Ex. D-3, D-4;
Tr. 97, 100 127, 136, 161) - one of which is Appellant.
Every party to the December 30 and 31 conveyances traced
their claim to water through these conveyances.
The deeds of conveyance dated December 30 and 31 are
clear and without ambiguity.
been claimed.

In fact, no ambiguity has ever

Thus, the water had to have passed under

statutory authority 73-1-11 as an appurtenance to the land
because there is absolutely no testimony to the contrary.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in Appellants Petition
for Writ of Certiorari this Court should grant the petition.
Respectfully submitted this ^*B

day of November, 1990.

PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL

John W. Anderson
Attorney for Appellant

5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to each of the following this ^ c \^~ day of
November, 1990.

John W. Anderson
E. J. SKEEN
50 SOUTH MAIN, #1600
P.O. BOX 45340
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84144
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
LIPPINCOTTS
KEITH S. CHRISTENSEN
230 SOUTH 500 EAST, #250
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
GREENE & WEED INVESTMENTS

6

ADDENDUM A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

L L J

_ ; AUG-J, 5 1990

ooOoo
Larry Little,

f

OPINION
(For Publication) ^fo? °* *• f*0'1

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 890177-CA

Greene & Weed Investments,
Leon S. Lippincott, Caroline
Lippincott, and Dee C. Hansen,
State Engineer of the State of
Utah,
Defendants and Appellees.

Sixth District, Kane County
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs
Attorneys:

John W. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Larry Little
E. J. Skeen, Salt Lake City, for Appellees Leon S.
Lippincott and Caroline Lippincott
Keith S. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Greene & Weed Investments

Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Garff.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Appellant appeals the trial court's decision awarding water
rights to the appellees.1 We affirm.
On January 16, 1968, Lester F. Little and Madge Little,
husband and wife, conveyed to their five children by warranty
deed 80.1 acres of land located in the Johnson Canyon area in
1. This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree which the
lower court certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 54(b). The lower court action was brought on two
counts: (1) a challenge to the state engineer's decision; and
(2) an action to quiet title to a water right. The issues below
were bifurcated. The quiet title action was tried first since
determination of the water right ownership will likely determine
the challenge to the state engineer's decision. The present
appeal concerns only the quiet title action.

Kanab, Utah. The deed conveyed to each an undivided one-fifth
interest M[t]ogether with all improvements and appurtenances
appertaining thereto." At the time of the conveyance the water
right later associated with the land had not yet been
certificated by the state engineer. This water right was carved
out of a larger water right application originally filed by
Lester on April 12, 1955 and approved by the state engineer on
October 15, 1958. On November 30, 1967, Lester filed the
application to segregate the water right in question. The new
application requested permission to appropriate .92 cubic feet
per second (cfs) out of the 10 cfs in the original application
for use on 83.3 acres. The state engineer opened a new file upon
receiving the segregated application.
Lester constructed diversion facilities and irrigated the
83.3 acres beginning in the early part of 1967. On December 19,
1967, Lester filed proof of appropriation with the state engineer
demonstrating that the diversion facilities were complete and
that the water had been placed to beneficial use. Approximately
one month after filing the proof of appropriation, but prior to
certification, Lester conveyed 80.1 of the 83.3 acres to his five
children.
The five children made several conveyances further dividing
the land. Appellant contends that the initial warranty deed from
Lester and Madge to the five children transferred the water right
as an appurtenance to the land. Therefore, the subsequent
warranty deeds issued by the children also passed the water
rights, and the quitclaim deeds and other documents relied upon
by appellees are irrelevant to the court's determination of title
to the water.
Appellees argue that the water rights were not conveyed in
the warranty deeds issued by Lester and Madge. Rather, they
argue that on November 17, 1969, Lester conveyed the entire water
right to Lorna and Clara, two of the five children, by quitclaim
deeds. They argue that water rights cannot be appurtenant to
land until after the state engineer issues a certificate of
appropriation. The trial court agreed and held that M[t]he water
right involved . . . did not pass as an appurtenance to land
conveyed before it was perfected by the issuance of a certificate
of appropriation by the State Engineer.H
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of the trial court's ruling is a question of law
which we review for correctness. Asav v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135,
1136 (Utah 1988); see Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286

(Utah 1980) ("[Q]uestions of legislative intent and statutory
application are matters of law, not of fact.M)
Appellant argues here that the water right becomes
appurtenant upon the filing of the proof of appropriation.2 He
therefore contends that the water right automatically transferred
in the warranty deed. He relies specifically on Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-1-11 (1989) which states that "[a] right to the use of
water appurtenant to land shall pass to the grantee of such
land" unless expressly reserved by the grantor. He also relies
on Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1989), which states that final water
rights may be transferred by deed in substantially the same
manner as real estate, and upon Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-18 (1989),
which states that rights claimed under water right applications
may be transferred by instruments in writing prior to issuance of
a certificate of appropriation.
To determine if the water right here was appurtenant to the
land at the time of the initial conveyance, we must look to the
nature of the right created by statute. See Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989), reh'a denied (1990); MosbvIrrigation Co. v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 46, 354 P.2d 848, 852
(1960). In determining the nature of this right we rely upon the
plain language of the statutes in question and prior case law.
Bonham, 788 P.2d at 500. In this analysis, we note that the
right to use and appropriate water is created by statute. See
Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852; Utah Code Ann.
§§ 73-3-1 to -29 (1989). The statutory procedure -prescribes the
exclusive manner in which such a right can be initiated, the
conditions upon which such right can be acquired, and the
procedural requirements which must be complied with." Criddle,
11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852.
Section 73-1-11 provides that Hwater appurtenant to land
shall pass to the grantee of such land . . . .- The term
-appurtenant" is not defined by statute. The Utah Supreme Court
has stated, however, that "[a] water right, acouired by
appropriation and used for a beneficial and necessary purpose in
connection with a given tract of land, is an appurtenance
thereto, and as such passes with the conveyance of the land,
unless expressly reserved from the grant.- Thompson v. McKinnev,
91 Utah 89, 98, 63 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1937) (emphasis added)
2. A proof of appropriation is the next to last step in the
statutory water appropriation process. Before a certificate of
appropriation is issued the applicant must first file the proof
of appropriation demonstrating that diversion facilities are
complete and that a stated quantity of water has been applied to
a beneficial use. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-16 (1989).

(quoting Lensina v. Dav & Hansen Sec. Co., 67 Mont. 382, 215 P.
999, 1000 (1923)).
Two steps must be completed before water becomes appurtenant
to land. First, the water must be beneficially applied to a
specific tract of land. Thompson, 91 Utah at 97-98, 63 P.2d at
1061. Second, all the statutory steps for appropriation must be
completed. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989) (no water rights
may be appropriated without first following statutory
requirements); Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46, 354 P.2d at 852;
Thompson. 91 Utah at 98, 63 P.2d at 1061 (appropriation plus
beneficial use equals appurtenant right); see also Eardlev v.
Terrv, 94 Utah 367, 375, 77 P.2d 362, 365 (1938). The first step
is completed when the proof of appropriation is filed. The
second step, however, can only be satisfied when the entire
statutory process is complete. Prior to completion of the entire
appropriation process, the applicant only has an inchoate3
right to the use of the water. See Criddle, 11 Utah 2d at 46,
354 P.2d at 852.
When Lester transferred the 80.1 acres to his five children
on January 16, 1968, the final statutory requirement in the
appropriative process, the issuance of a certificate, had not
been accomplished. Even though Lester had previously completed
the diversion facilities, applied the water to beneficial use,
and filed the proof of appropriation, the water right could not
be appurtenant to the land. The appropriation process is
complete only after the certificate of appropriation is issued
and that certificate then becomes -prima facie evidence- of the
owner's water right. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (1989);4
3. The term "inchoate" means "[i]mperfect; partial; unfinished;
begun, but not completed . . . .- Black's Law Dictionary 686
(5th ed. 1979).
4. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-17 (1989) provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
Upon it being made to appear to the
satisfaction of the state engineer that an
appropriation . . . has been perfected in
accordance with the application therefor,
and that the water appropriated . . . has
been put to a beneficial use, as required
by Section 73-3-16, he shall issue a
certificate . . . . The certificate so
issued and filed shall be prima facie
evidence of the owner's right to the use
of the water in the quantity, for the
purpose, at the place, and during the time
specified therein, subject to prior rights.

Eardlev, 94 Utah at 375, 77 P.2d at 365 ("[N]o final rights are
acquired until the proof . . . is made and a certificate has been
issued by the state engineer."); Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake
View Duck Club. 50 Utah 76, 81, 166 P. 309, 311 (1917)
(certificate is appropriator's deed of title good against the
state and against everyone else who cannot show a superior
right).
We therefore conclude that the January 16, 1968 warranty
deed did not transfer the water as an appurtenance to the land.
The trial court properly found that the November 19, 1969
quitclaim deed did transfer
the water right at a time when that
right was fully vested.5
S

Tl>b decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:
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RufTsell W./Bench, ijudge

« 6 g n a l W . Garff,

Judge' /
/ /

5. In its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that
Lester and Madge intended to transfer the entire water right in
the November 17, 1969 quitclaim deed, even though that deed
contained an incorrect property description. The trial court's
decision was based in part on a subsequent undated quitclaim
deed and on other documents which revealed the grantors'
intent. We find no error in the trial court's ruling.

